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Harold Bloom is a brilliant man. The essays in this collection on particular
poets, on Strand, Ashbery. Ammons, and Hollander are for the most part superb
recoveries of distinctive and complex imaginative projects. But Harold Bloom
also has ambitions to theory and even to prophecy which produce the demonic
Other of purely literary brilliance-an incredible sloppiness and arrogance
towards logic and discursive reasoning which makes me wonder how literary
criticism maintains even the minimum level of respectability it has among
intellectual disciplines. If Bloom is one of our best and most influential critical
fathers, 'One can only despair about the ephebes who respectfully accord him
authority.
The themes and method of argument 'Of this work are established by Bloom's
initial definition 'Of literary meaning:
The meaning of a strong poem is another strong poem, a precursor's
poem which is being misinterpreted, revised, corrected, evaded, tvvisted
askew, made to suffer an inclination or bias which is the property of
the later and not the earlier poet. Poetic influence, in this sense, is
actually a poetic misprision, a poet's taking or doing amiss of a parent-

poem that keeps finding him ... (p. 9).
This definition almost forces the critic to make arbitrary parallels between
poems, to work a gDod deal of the time on levels of abstract generality which
enable him to posit resemblances while ignoring distinctive qualities (since
meaning is not a property of particulars), to argue for the importance of
traditions defining chains of influence-here primarily an American Romantic
Orphic Tradition deriving from Emerson-and tD treat poetic creation in
essentially psychological tenns as a version of the Sartrean desire to posit one's
own origins and become a god since the poet is deprived of any concrete
existential concerns. Moreover this definition exemplifies Bloom's characteristic
forms of argument. There is no recognition that his is on the face of it an
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odd definition of meaning with no philosophical support and indeed no concern
for the issues discussed in contemporary disputes on the subject. Bloom does
not even deign to discuss those who share his insistence that meaning is
primarily a function of relationships between texts. And for good reason, since
Levi-Strauss and Derrida are far more respectable-the former arguing that
meaning is not just another work but the informing structural logic unfolded
by various versions of a myth and the latter showing how there is a necessary
oscillation among texts so that it is impossible to define any fised relationship
between individual poems.
The ultimate irony in Bloom's casually dismissing any careful consideration of
the question of meaning is that his definition does not even logically support
his own purposes. If one refuses to treat mealling first as a property of a
specific utterance, he has no way of lmowing what poems are its precursors,
because he neither Imows what he is seeking a precursor for nor what the
precursor might mean without knowing its precursor, ad infinitum. Indeed if
there are to be strong poets at all, the critic must be able to understand the
precursor in order to gage the strength of the misinterpretation. If there are
no coherent particular meanings, there is no meaning to the concept of misinterpretation. And finally it is a travesty of Nietzsche's and Yeats's theories
of antithetical expression to treat strength as misinterpretation. Strength for
them depends on understanding the other, be it a person or a tragic condition,
and then on creating a counter-expression that fully engages the other's strength.
Misinterpretation, then, is a sign of weakness, not of strength, because it
implies that the writer could not face his antagonist direcdy.
The reviewer of Bloom must make a choice. He can overlook the sloppy
arguments and stress the often superb practical criticism or he can take Bloom as
a model of less than capable criticism, at least to those who dream that
criticism can lie a respectable and debatable fonn of public discourse. I choose
the latter course because it is the road less taken and because this book provides.
so powerful a guide for "strong criticism." We might see it, in fact, as
exemplifying six. revisionary ratios which show us how the critic "can convert
his inheritance into what will aid him without inhibiting him by the anxiety
of a failure in priority, a failure to have begotten himself" (10).
1) Clinmnen. In criticism this tenn refers normally to a creative swerve away
from what a quotation seems to say. It also includes really ambitious revisionary:
swerves from all standards of common sense and qualified argument into
sweeping generalizations. The latter are the most strilringly audacious figures:
on influence, "Poets, who congenitally lie about so many matters, never tell
the truth about poetic influence" (173); on Emerson's stating that the blank
in nature is in our own eye, "This is the more than Coleridgean formula ...which
made possible the Romantic poem in America, down to this present day" (48);
and on Stevens' Americanness, "Stevens fulfilled the unique enterprise of a
specifically American poetry by exposing the essential solipsism of our Native
Strain. No American feels free when he is not alone, and every American's
passion for Yes affirms a hidden belief that his soul's substance is no part of
the creation" (110).
After these, mere misreading of given passages seems downright meek, so I
will cite only one example (for others, cf pp. 42, 73, 79, 84, 85, 87, 88). The
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subject of discussion is Emerson's passage on the transparent eyeball which
ends, "I am nothing; I see all; the currents of the Universal Being circulate
through me; I am part or parcel of God. I am the lover of uncontained and
immortal beauty" (49). Now Bloom, after citing the journal entry from
which Emerson took this passage and which lacks the reference to seeing:
"Though Emerson centers on his eyes, he sees nothing, but inherits beauty and
power... .B,eauty is not in things seen, not even by seeing into the life of things,
but is the recognition of self, and power is one with self" (50). Here the
strong critic makes two moves we would not expect in one who accepts
established critical procedures. First he makes assertion do the work of
argument. Misreading the passage saves one the labor of showing that there
indeed may be parallels between solipsism, faith in an impersonal absolute mind,
and oceanic self-abnegation by which vision leads to a sense of divine immanence.
Having taken tIns step (which also enables one to ignore the priority of
Quentin Anderson on these themes), he is prepared to conflate the apparently
different treatments of self in Whitman, Stevens, Ashbery and Ammons and to
make sloppy use of the Tractatus in order to equate Romantic sublimity with
what Bloom calls " solipsistic realism." And second, Bloom's rage for
generality ignores the most interesting differences between Emerson's journal
entry and the passage in H Nature." The journal entry is dead sentimental
public rhetoric wInch becomes transformed well after the experience into a
dynamic and dramatic moment of personal vision. Bloom in effect misprises
Emerson into a thinker and ignores the qualities of his art-mistaking what
he says leads to neglecting what he does.
2) Tessera. In criticism this device allows more bravura performances than
clinamen because it entails taking a whole poem, retaining its terms, but
meaning them in an opposite sense from the author's. Again there are two
basic uses of this ratio. First the strong critic simply asserts the true source or
meaning of a metaphor or an allusion. Hence the spirits Coleridge invokes in
"Religious Musings" are "Miltonic Angels" (8); when Coleridge blesses his
son at the end of "Frost at Midnight" "he is in some sense poetically
, misinterpreting' the beautiful declaration of Adam to Eve, 'With thee conversing I forget all time'" (12); Stevens' Interior Paramour is "his version of
WlntInan's Fancy," (106) and his" Poem with Rhythms" "has a lndden origin
in Whitman's (The Sleepers'" (116); and, to conclude what could be an
endless list once the strong critic has mastered the use of phrases like "in
some sense" and" hidden origins," when Emily Dickinson tells us "Paradise is
an 'uncertain certainty' ...we know she means the Paradise of Poets, which
is Orphic" (84). (This last phrase creates a rare double tessera).
The second type of Tessera reverses the meaning of a whole poem. For
example, Yeats's "Cuchulain Comforted" is read essentially as a paradoxical
equation of Cuchulain and the cowards becoming birds and as a version of
English concerns for the sanction of a community with respect to death
(96-99). Here strength consists in ignoring both Yeats's repeated insistences
on death as the moment of solitary triumph over circumstances and his
structural contrast between Cuchulain's integrity and the cowards' metamorphoses because they renounced heroic identity. Or take a more concrete
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example where the text is quoted and then perverted. I give the concluding
lines from Stevens, filled with first person plural terms:
The right within us and about us
Joined, the triumphaut vigor, felt,
The inner direction on which we depend,
That which keeps us the little that we are
The aid of greatness to be and the force
Now Bloom, still refusing to distinguish an impersonal version of self and
mind from Emersonian self-reliance: "There is nothing communal here" (109).
3) Kenans. This is a Bloomian speciality. It involves making momentary
concessions only to empty out the law of contradiction and free the theoretical
critic from stubborn data (or from those trappings of naruralism that have always
offended the Blake in Bloom). Here is a pure example" of kenosis: "The root
meaning of 'desultory' is 'vaulting,' and though Coleridge consciously meant
that his poem skipped about and wavered, his imagination meant vaulting, for
'Religious Musings' is a wildly ambitious poem. 'This is the time,' it begins.
in direct recall of Milton's' Nativity Hymn,' yet it follows not the Hymn. .."
(7). But this ratio is most effective when combined with tessera, as in this
comment after quoting the "Dionysiac" (51) Emerson telling us that sublime
vision comes only "to a. pure and simple soul in a clean and chaste body":
"This may sound merely conventional, or even tiresomely sensible, but like
Whitman's almost pathological emphasis on purity and cleanliness and Dickinson's obsession with her White Election, it is a sublime passage of Orphic
enthusiasm..." (79; for similar, wilder logic, see 100-101).
Kenosis is particularly useful when one is confronted by contradictions that
might make a weaker critic qualify his generalizations. Suppose for example
one must deal with the various models of the self I have m~ntioned while also
reconciling the scepticism and sense of limits of later poets with the prime
precursor, Emerson of "Nature" and "Self-Reliance". First you quote
Ashbery on the blindness of the ego, then Emerson on the self joining God,
and you link them by "The closest (though dialectically opposed) analogue
[to Ashberyl" (136-137). Then you can string their differences together as
parallels. And for the more difficult problem of making Emerson's optimism
the source of a modern sense of poverty, the critic need only invoke the later
Emerson (conveniently forgetting that he had earlier condemned this Emerson for inauthentic ally submitting to the reality principle, p. 63) and try a
daring double kenosis on the same page:
This is the faith of Emersonian Self-Reliance, yet severely mitigated
by the consciousness of late-coming.. " TIle later Ammons writes out
of a vision" Transcendental only by its bottomless entropy," yet still
Emersonian, though this is the later Emerson of the Conduct of Life,
precursor of Stevens... (142).
4. Daemonization. The
arguments-the later three
daemonization is Bloom's
principle in poems which

first three ratios are essential to supporting strong
to developing full scale theories. Of the last group
forte. It consists in discovering a power or a
lies just beynd the author's knowledge; hence the
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critic can in effect invent and impose his own version of latent content in
these works. This principle then is absolutely necessary for Bloom's central
project, at least if my own weak daemonizing of his work is correct. For behind
Bloom's speculations on influence lies an important and serious problemhow do we explain originality and change in literature. If onc takes this
problem as resolveable in terms of a single theory (and only a mind immune
to the cautionary work in recent philosophy would so expect a single general
explanation for such diverse materials), he must posit two constants. He needs
a view of what is being changed-hence Bloom's insistence on precursors and
traditions-and a psychology of why change occurs-hence Bloom's principle of
anxiety and of the poets' desire to become God by appropriating his predecessors
and positing his own origins. Now given the multiplicity of the data such
a theory must account for, daemonization is crucial. Bloom's project requires
myth-making as completely as does the enterprise of metaphysically defining
first principles or the shape of history, and daemonization allows one to posit
a level of reality not contradicted by the particulars such myths claim to
explain. By so abstracting the nature of influence, Bloom can ignore (after
utilizing kenosis to mention) the facts that Pater hardly ever mentioned his
precursor Ruskin, that Dickinson only once mentions Orpheus, or that Stevens
seems to have been far more interested in Coleridge and French poetry than
in American Romanticism. All Bloom needs is the chance to draw parallels from
roughly common themes; daemonizati?n provides the principles for justifying
them, whatever a given poet says or thinks.
In this book, Bloom's daemonizing project is to adapt his theory of influence to
the specific task of establishing Emerson's Orphism as the basic precursor
defining the "native strain" and true tradition of American poetry. His
argument is suggestive, if difficult to summarize. Orphism is a true American
religion, opposed to most theology because it worships "the real mysteries of
life, of potencies (daimons) rather than personal gods (theoi); it is the
worship of life itself in its supreme mysteries of ecstasy and love." (80). Then,
given this base (which is general enough to make Dante and Shakespeare
Orphic poets, as indeed Elizabeth Sewall, another of Bloom's unacknowledged
precursors, has claimed), Bloom defines the Orphic poet by three basic features.
He resists all influence in his rage for immediacy and divination in all its
forms (a feature often contradicted in the book); he worships the divinities
Eros, Dionysius, and Anankej and he engages in a pursuit of total vision always
threatening" a loss of divinity)' (69).
Each claim in his argument, however, soon runs into trouble and requires
rescue by daemoruzation and the three specific ratios. The basic assertion that
there is one tradition or native strain in American poetry (75, 147) will not
bear much analysis because it involves ignoring or trivializing poets like
Eliot, Williams, and Lowell and must turn simpJe differences into opposition
to Emerson in order to preserve his centrality (123-24). Moreover all sorts
of distinctions, like that between different modes of presenting the self, must
be collapsed to preserve coherence in the tradition. Thus only rhetoric
manages to get the Orphic Trinity in as a constant: if Stevens seems to wander
from the fold, in a given poem, Bloom confides that the Emersonian echoes are
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admittedly faint but at least Stevens' recognition of limits and praise of
poverty can be seen as invoking Ananke (85, perhaps Pope too then is Orphic)
and again, on Dickinson, "Life is solipsistic transport extended to the Baechie
commonal through her poems" (83). Then, when the going gets rougher,
Bloom can only assert contradictory truths and hope for weak readers who will
not be taken aback by claims that Ashbery and Ammons participate in the same
tradition and yet "have no common qualities" (129). In a similar vein,
Orphics seek priority, but also worship time (81), they seek to overcome
death but also invoke Ananke (83, 90, 93); and they court authentic loss but
they also work at persuading "necessity to remit her oracles that prescribe
our wanderings" (69, 79). These contradictions, in turn, are bolstered by
four daemonizing strategies: Bloom claims that poets not faithful to his vision
deceive themselves (144), are unwilling Orphics despite their explicit intentions
(85, 86, 131, 138), present spent versions of an Orphic faith rather than new
explorations of a different faith (87, 142), or are failures because they do not
have the content of the transcendental Orphic tradition (e. g. 128-29 where this
charge mistakes Merwin's very deliberate attempts to explore the space of
Biblical vision when no traditional mythic contents are available to consciousness).
5. Askesis. This is the turn towards solitude that marks the critic strong enough
to present a fully original theory no longer even interested in accounting for or
directing particular reading experiences. Since it pervades all Bloom's work,
we need only note one aspect of its effects. Bloom could make sense of
all the contradictions created by his arguments about a distinctive American
tradition if he would follow others who treat a myth precisely as a structure
capable of preserving a field of contradictions. But then he would be only a
latecomer and would have to renounce his more dramatic psychological theories
of the agon of influence and accept a less exalted place for his strong poets t
perhaps for the solipsistic ego itself.
6. Apophrades. This ratio manifests itself as holding open one's work to what
had previously determined it-now others can enter because the poet is strong
enough to be generous, strong enough in fact to make it appear he has written
his precursor's work. In critical practice, however, apopbrades creates a
system so loose that it triumphs over logic and competing critical views, all of
which become versions of it. Here Bloom even triumphs over both common
sense and his own theory. Consider his case on Emerson. Emerson is praised
for being so strong an American poet dlat he overcomes the anxiety of
influence and simply asserts his originality (69,133). Yet Bloom's whole theory
insists that "strong poets become strong by meeting the anxiety of influence,
not be [sic] evading it (141)." Perhaps once one reaches aiJophrades he just
leaves his work open to the most radically opposed claims, like a non-Orphic
god finally triumphant over Manicheanism. (The same trap occurs in Bloom's
explanation of the relative lack of strength in American Jewish poetry as
caused by the lack of a strong precursor. But if strength requires a precursor,
we logically have an infinite regress and no possible original strong poet).
If we dwell exclusively on the logical contradictions overcome here by
apopbrades, however, we miss Bloom's ultimately audacity. His hero free
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from influence is Emerson-the man normally seen as the most eclectically
dependent of major American literary figures, the man, in fact, whose triumph
depended on his inability to understand fully those influences he could not
dream of surpassing. Even the concept of power Bloom so admires in Emerson is
bastardized Wordsworth, just as his transcendentalism is watered down and

Americanized from Carlyle's simplifications of German Idealism.

Emerson has

more charm than strength, and in order to understand the strength he does have~
we must turn to Lawrence not to Bloom. For Emerson's triumph was in

partially adapting Carlyle to the American struggle for escape from Mastery,
Kingship, and fatherhood.
Bloom's book is a chastening experience to one who believes there can be
both capable imaginations and responsible criticism of them. Bloom stands,
rightly, for speculative and philosophical criticism rather than mindless
gathering of facts or proliferating of interpretations. But his defense of the
mind is really its defeat, because he relies on wild generalizations and does not
fully trust his own considerable power in expressing its noblest traits-a capacity
to register subtle qualities and to adapt generalizations by careful qualifications
and reasoned, debatable distinctions. Das Mystiche or "the actual divinity
already present in the creative spirit" (94) cannot in our age lie in bold
mythmaking or paradoxical assertions praising poets' refusals to accept death
(90). Instead it consists in those moments when minds discipline themselves
sufficiently to define new and publicly shareable apprehensions of distinct
particulars and relationships. Bloom has raised interesting questions which
might lead to such revelations-especially in his description of ironies attendant
upon the poet's paradoxical task of at once disclosing meanings and sharing the
divine property of creating them and in his articulation of strategies by which
thinkers must come to terms with the past and adjust it to the present. But
our ambiguous relationship to the past does not warrant a single theory of
influence and self-creation. The past exists in ideas, intuitions, and principles of
authority, as well as in precursor poets, and it provides terms poets and
thinkers can adjust to present realities in a wide variety of ways. And strength
consists not so much in pure self-creation as in adapting one's performance of
his ego to common problems and purposes. AI; Stevens put it (in his desire to
escape, not to affirm, solipsism), « The measure of the poet is the measure of his.
sense of the world and of the extent to which it involves the sense of other
people."
In this context, it is tempting to describe Bloom's book as a tragic failure.
Its errances stem from a brilliance unwilling to accept the standards and limits
of the social traditions defining his discipline. But using terms like "tragic"
for literary criticism smacks of influence by the pomposities of a critic who
"prophesies" that Ammons will be the major poet of our age. Vico's influence
is more acceptable and needs no revisionary misinterpretation: "These must be
tlle bounds of human reason. And let him who would transgress them
beware lest he transgress all humanity."
II
The other booles under review help us understand, if not condone, Bloom's
exoess. If they are typical, they show that our profession does not provide the
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competition that might hold Bloom to canons of logic and reasonable evidence.
Those who arc careful and logical tend, as even the best of these books
indicates, to be dull and uninterested in complex ideas Of the imaginative
vitality of poems and poets. Then, in reaction, anything complex and
speculative seems preferable-especially when traditional ideals of criticism as
humble mediation of poems threaten to make us all latecomers without recourse
to fathering ourselves and when we resist methods of close reading that at
least provide concrete fields for testing the performance of critical intelligence.
The first three of the following books make this reviewer despair-not so
much because they are bad as because they seem so simply ordinary and
unnecessary. They express no pleasure in the operations of critical intelligence
and thus offer no testimony of the way poems dramatize the complexity and
depth of the imagination. They are content simply to describe poems and
themes, with little careful analysis, sustained argument, or concern for contexts
of any kind. One wonders if the authors have thought at all about what
functions these books might serve or what audience they are addressing. They
write Baedekers of imaginary worlds, Baedekers one suspects, intended for
those who never leave home. Those already interested in the poets will know
virtually everything the books say, and those the books might be useful for
will probably have neither aause nor desire to read them.
Lensing and Moran's book on the "emotive imagination" in Bly, Wright,
Simpson and Stafford could have been much more than the dull piece of work
it is. Their topic is a distinctive mode of post-modern poetry first described by
Donald Hall (1962), in which concrete subjects of lyric simplicity are suddenly
transformed, by the shift to surreal, a-logical images, "into a personal and
subjective instant of emotion" (p. 11). We are all familiar with the mode.
We want to lmow the poetic ends it might serve, the aesthetic and ontologica~
values sustaining it, the problems the mode creates and the complexity of the
solutions posed, and the relations it has-in conceptual and finally in evaluative
terms, to other modern modes. Instead we get little marc than a tedious and
imprecise working out 'Of what Hall said in just a few pages. We are told that
the simplicity of this mode makes poetry available to a large audience, that it
frees us from the limits of rationality (if only critics could approach these
limits) so that mythic and emotive dimensions are implicated in ordinary
experience, and that the poems rely on features not emphasized by the New
Criticism like personification and "timing" in order to capture an "imaginative interplay between subject and attitude, world and levels of the unconscious "
(p. 11).
Mter this the book becomes less interesting. The second chapter explores the
relationship of this mode primarily to imagist techniques and to the modified
surrealist poetry translated by Bly and Wright. But while the authors recognize the oversimplification of Bly's manifestos, they for the most part accept
his evaluations. Thus they ignore the link between Pound's definition of the
image as recording "the precise instant when a thing outward and objective
transforms itself, or darts into a thing inward and subjective" (quoted, p. 30)
and Bly's description of the image as a sudden leap inward. And by accepting
Ely's critique of imagist poetry as lacking "the subjective," they do not
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consider crucial problems about how a poem can be meaningfully inward
without being vague and mushy or how the modernist aesthetic of rendering
and presentation provides a context for at once interpreting and measuring this
new mode. Then on the translations, they simply describe obvious features,
leaving themselves in an interesting dilemma. The surface features they describe
are present in much Romantic verse, especially Impressionist poetry of the
1890's, 50 what is new about their four poets? But to show what is new would
involve analyzing beliefs and rhetorical strategies, thus calling into question
their simplistic concepts of subjectivity and "beyond rationality." Subjectivity
rendered in poetry is artificial and objective, and poetry (most good poetry, at
least) uses very rational means to reach ends not available to scientific rationality. More important, their level of analysis precludes their considering the
limits of the genre, or at least the kind of problems the poets must solve. Poems
that proceed primarily by descriptive images and then shift to non-logical
imagistic connections are likely to sustain simple, even banal, conceptual
oppositions-say between unconscious and reason, Bly's live world and dead
world, subjective and objective, the infinity of surfaces, or the authenticity of
poetic souls and the narrowness of all bourgeois and technological thought.
Moreover such poems, working without ideas and on sharply opposed levels,
leave no room for refinements of thinking or for dialectical working out of
problems-there is only the vague infinite to save us from surfaces and bourgeois
values. Bly wants emotional shock, unaware that shock rarely creates deeper
awareness or enduring feelings; shock in fact is the staple of Gothic art-now
with the unconscious as our Castle of Otranto.
Still, there is room for poems dramatically creating the sense of imaginative
expansiveness these poets seek, and indeed some of their work is quite good.
But one will not find out why in the individual chapters devoted to each poet.
Lensing and Moran tell us that this poetry, opposed to academic New
Criticism, requires a new mode of criticism. Unfortunately their opposition
leads them to ignore any method that concentrates on what poems do as unique
structures. Their critiques usually read like bad dissertations: themes are
mentioned, briefly described and then exemplified as indeed present in a.
number of poems (" Other poems in the New Poems section recall some of
Wright's earlier topics," p. 122). The Stafford cha,pter, for example, states his
general aim as the use of images, frequently and profoundly" mythic" (another
undefined problematic term) searching for an II earlier age identifiable by
certain spiritual values associated with the wilderness," values which can sustain the poet and our technological age (p. 178). Then the catalogueexamples of Stafford's nostalgic memories of childhood, his idealizing of his
father, his extension of his father into the exemplary figure of the Indian at
home in the wilderness, his use of wilderness ideals as a critique of contemporary society, and finally his use of emotive imagination to kef1P alive a
boyhood world and to sustain, through a series of horizontal metaphors (like
the "journey"), a set of vertical hierarchies contrasting an outer world of
surfaces and shadows to an underground world the poet tries to reveal.
Jonathan Holden's book on Stafford is no more complex and no less patronizing in its pedagogic relationship to the reader. But Holden has chann
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because he moves as slowly and cautiously and precisely as Stafford. And, in
the course of developing his catalogue of themes and examples, he at least
tries to relate his themes in a dialectical fashion and he places the emotive
imagination clearly in a context of beliefs and desires. Holden treats imagination
as Stafford's central theme, arguing that Stafford envisions it as nurtUred by a
sense of distance which elects fascination with the hidden, the dark, and
the invisible-all properties which render vision inadequate and require supplementing by the imagination. Each metaphor eliciting imagination is then
tediously traced through Stafford. Subsequent chapters develop related themes
especially the relationship between nature and a sense of place (without
considering how conunon this concern is among Romantic and contemporary
poets or the problems it creates), the use of these relationships for social
criticism, and the sense of self as continually discovered in what the poet can
make visible: "The marks which the walker leaves behind are his best
and only clue to his ultimate identity" (p. 61). Holden is interesting on the
relationship between self and imagination, but he works in a historical and
philosophical vacuum" a vacuum especially evident if we recall Bloom's far
more complex and expansive treatment of similar themes in his discussion of
Ashbery, Ammons, and Strand. If Bloom errs by excess, Holden errs by being
too careful. He never allows himself to elaborate the life in Stafford's metaphors or to treat poems as complex structures expanding levels of awareness.
Gary Lane's shaft boole on Cummings comes from the same, not very promising series by the University of Kansas press. And he too takes on the
character of his subject-a brash Romantic energy, individualism, and conceptual
superficiality that can be embarrassing without Cummings' wit and chann.
Lane's book is not a book-it has no conceptual structure but offers five chapters
(with a short introduction and conclusion) each giving brief dose-readings of
five poems on the topics of seduction, heroic individualism, death, satire, and
"Love's Function." In choosing to celebrate Cummings through generally
accurate (though often strained) close readings, Lane has made a bad strategic
choice. Most of Cummings' good poetry relies on sharp, witty expressions
of cliched and uncomplicated values, so his poetic effects stem usually from
surprise rather than depth. Thus, even though he is perhaps excessively
conscious of the limits of criticism, Lane's analyses either trivialize Cummings
or themselves. The latecomer offering a third critical book on Cununings has
very little to do, a problem Lane confronts in two ways. First he tries to make
up in enthusiasm and energy of style what he lacks in subdety. The result is
that he seems likeable, though often a possible object of satire in his own right"these words of a dead man ... can modify the guts of the living" (p. 4), and
"Cummings tried to board his readers at a station deeper than intellect" (p.
S). Second he tries to defend Cummings' ideas and his greatness as a poet-a
task requiring a critic with more faith in the powers of intellect. His praise of
Cummings is often vitiated by bad taste: for example, Lane tries to convince
us that the image "the keen primeval silence of your hair" has its "own
precisions, indelible, alive, highly specific" (p. 26), and he chooses as his
climactic subject Cummings' "all worlds have halfsight, seeing either with," a
poem with lines like" he's free into the beauty of truthj/and strolls the axis of
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the universe/love."

For Lane this poem is the" fitting summation of a life's

work of celebrative ecstasy" (p. 108). Two passages where Lane defends
Cummings' values should provide a similar fitting swnmation of this critic's
celebrative ecstasy:
Prufrock, in short, has lacked the selfhood and the courage to I' [squeeze]

the universe into a ball/To roll it towards some overwhelming question."
You-i has dared that question-and gaily watched the ball of the earth
fall away (p. 38).
Death may be apprehended not as rigid finality but as sea change, not
as end but as new beginning, and so seen, it "shall have no dominion"
(p. 57).

If Lane in his most egregious moments seems the ephebe of Bloom's prophetic
pomposity and his literary superficiality in dealing with philosophical themes,
J enijoy La Belle is a more careful and less ambitious image of the scholarly
Bloom. Her book on Roethke is an accurate, intelligent study of his uses of
past writers. She has no general theories warping her performance of an
important function in not only reminding us of how bookish a poet Roethke.
was, but also in explaining the various ways he made use of the past as a
means for expanding his imaginative identity. Her main thesis is that Reothkels
dance involves history as well as nature. Roethke seeks union both with his
natural body and with that larger imaginative body which Blake imaged as
Albion and Roethke, like Frye, found figured in poetic tradition. She supports
her thesis with a remarkable breadth of learning. No book on influence can
be convincing in all its particulars because of the varying degrees of similarity
we must expect. Yet Professor La Joy's hard work and judicious use of
Roethke's prose and notebooks make a convincing general case.
Her treatment of Roethke's changing uses of allusion is worth summarizing
(she does so in an aAPendix). Roethke's early poetry finds itself trapped in
resenting the very models (often minor modern poets) it feeds on. Conventionality and originality are at war. But when Roethke turns to reflect on his
own origins in Tbe Lost Son, he finds his quest at once directed and deepened
by employing archetypal structures of growth and development articulated by
the Romantic tradition. These themes, and Roethke's growth concern to
reconcile interior and exterior forces, lead him in his middle period primarily
to Wordsworth's Prelude and Excursion. Then, as Roethke turns to more
formal and meditative poetic forms, his field of allusions reaches further back
to metaphysical poetry and he begins to use echoes in a variety of ways-for
contrast as well as complement, and for formal as well as thematic effects,
until his last work blends in complex orchestration a wide range of influences
which at once particularize and place his vision.
Although La Joy frequently offers sharp explanations of the effects achieved
by allusions, she often lets her pursuit of parallels blind her to the distinctive
tones and energies of Roethke's poems. Moreover she might have learned from
critics like Bloom how to give more vitality and tension to the problems
involved in relating past and present or in so blurring one's individuality in
pursuit of a larger identity (for Roeuhke's madness took the form of oceanic
identification with his surroundings). And she might have been more careful

BOOK

REvIEws

361

in making distinctions: she need not make claims like II once the special
context is discovered ... we realize the poem's true subject" (p. 15, as if the
poet wrote only for SQurce hunters), nor need she so readily equate explicit and
unconscious allusions or allusions with similarities stemming from shared thematic concerns and repeated conventions.
In this desert, even a pretty good book on Roethke becomes an oasis. Usually
we simply scan or ignore mediocre critical books, but being forced to read them
carefully for a review raises some disturbing thoughts about the profession
(perhaps only because even these thoughts become relief from tedium and, in
Bloom's case, ex~eration). There are sufficient signs in all these books that
the authors are more intelligent and humane than their books. The books,
then, must take their form in larg,e part because of the profession's lack of any.
sense of the functions of literary criticism and its f-allure to train people either\
to think analytically or to pose contexts and questions which might lead to
meaningful inquiries. Such training might make it possible to read criticism as an
exercise in imaginary dialogue rather than as an excuse for invidiously comparing oneself with the authors. Maybe we can motivate people to begin
changing the profession if we make them all write omnibus reviews.

State University of New York at BUffalo

Jules Michelet: Nature, History, and Language by Linda Orr. Ithaca and
London: Cornell University Press, 1976. Pp. xvi
215. $12.50.

+

Ms. Orr has done much to revive interest in a writer long neglected by
American and English scholars. Until recendy, Jules Michelet was esteemed
primarily as a kind of national monument in France (Charles De Gaulle liked
him and Joan of Arc) and as a kind of failed historian elsewhere (too lyrical,
not objective enough, self-indulgent as a stylist, got his facts wrong, etc.).
Combining the techniques of traditional (New) criticism with aspects of contemporary French semiotic theory and a dash of psychoanalytical lore, Ms. Orr
has at once pushed forward a line of inquiry opened up by Roland :&Imes in
his remarkable Micbelet par lui merne (1954), imaginatively utilized the archival
researches into Michelet's life carried out by Paul Viallaneix, and made an
original contribution in her own right to our appreciation of Michelet's complex
literary endowment. Like Barthes, she has delved deeply into the obscure
reaches of Michelet's II obsessions," but she has redeemed Michelet's late
nature studies as something more than aberrations in the life of the historical
scholar. She has shown the continuity between Michelet's conception of
history, on the one side, and his obsessive search for the "secret" of nature anq
its processes, on the other. More importandy, however, she has, in her analysis
of the rhetoric of Michelet's prose, disclosed the logic of his thought processes.
in both historical and natural studies. At the same time, she forbears to claim.
for her author an authority in either domain greater than he can legitimately
claim.
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Disillusioned by the failure of the Revolution of 1848 and dismissed from his
professorship at the College de France for his "liberal" views, Michelet took
a new young wife and headed south for his health. There he took a. new
interest in nature, previously a blind spot or at least an unexamined mystery in
his earlier speculations on history, culture, and civilization. Under the influence
of his wife and the salubrious effects of the mudbaths, that "nature," which
he had formerly ranged against "humanity" and treated as the "villain" of
man's quest for salvation, was now transformed into the protagonist and hero
of a cosmic drama, of which "history" was now conceived to be only a
secondary manifestation. Between 1856 and 1868, the reformed anti-naturalist
published four "natural histories," as shocking to his former admriers as they
were offensive to scientists everywhere. These were The Bird, The Insect,
The Ocean, and The Mountain. Formerly treated as unfortunate lapses in the
career of a great (or at least popular) historian, they are now treated as
principal documents for comprehending the literary stylistic patterns of a
great rhetorician. By pursuing the historian's strange inquiries into a subject
about which, to say the least, he had virtually no scientific lmowledge, Ms.
Orr has succeeded in laying bare the literary dimensions of the historian's works.
Michelet's "medl0d II was the same in both kinds of endeavor: empathetic.
Still the unrepentant Romanticist (though he rejected the label), Michelet
sought to penetrate to the interior of his objects of study and to experience the
processes operating in earth, sea, and sky. In his study of birds, insects, etc.,.
he would, he tells us, "avoid human analogy as muoh as possible." But this did
not lead to the elimination of what Ms. Orr (somewhat ambiguously) calls
" dialectics" from his view of nature. In his study of nature, as in his study
of history, a sense of the painful clash of opposities remains present as an
organizing perception: "life/death, subject/object, individual/humanity, past/
present, reality/illusion, inside/outside, up/down, fate/freedom, unity/mu1ti~
plicity, grace/justice, nature/man." His ;purpose, it seems, was to demonstrate
that these oppositions were not to be construed in the manner of warring
Manichean principles, but understood rather as "organizations of movement
and change, ambiguous poles of value in the context of mutually dependent
couples."
How were they mediated? Or rather, how was it possible to imagine their
mediation in such a way as to account for those H monsters" that appeared at;
the point of their conjunction? Ms. Orr correctly points out that this interest
in (and fear of) "monsters" in nature was characteristic of the age; it appear~
in Darwin as well as in Michelet. But the poet differed from the scientist in
the domain to which he had recourse for a model by which to explicate the
process of interchange. In language itself, Ms. Orr suggests, Michelet found
at least one process in which unity in change could be comprehended. By
exploiting the possibilities of conversion provided by poetry and rhetoric,
Michelet purported to show how that which appeared horrible and evil-the
spider, for example-could be successively recharacterized, so as to become
transformed into something beautiful and good.
Yet, this verbally created image of harmony, order, and health was alway~
threatened by that which underlay it or transcended it, that which lay" beyond"
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it, whether in the blinding light of the heavens which obscured all difference
or in the viscous seabed where all was a formless one, Moreover1 there appeared
to be gaps in the continuum that not even poesis could deal with, as his study
of insects revealed. The undifferentiated, the vacuous, and the illicitly mixed
continued to haunt Michelet, a function, Ms. Orr (following many other critics)
argues, of his ambiguous, potentially incestuous relation to his mother and a
resultant sexual ambivalence. Whatever its cause, the horror of these gaps in
the continuum of nature became bearable only within the context of a consciously cultivated irony that was both" rhetorical and philosophical." In the
end, Michelet professed the wisdom of the "comedian" who goes his way
with the knowledge that there is "one fixed thing in the world: change." Bu~
he was never to extend this irony to the consideration of his first passion:
history. That remained the basis for a deathless hope for redemption, remnant
of an irrepressible fantasy of return to the womb-sublimated perhaps into a
utopian vision of a future in which humanity would be both free and unified.
Ms. Orr's book is written with wit, learning, and insight and is a treasure
of lvlichelet's fascinating bizcrrreries, but it is never frivolous and always returns
us to the complex humanity of the individual who is its subject. It is, as they
now say in France, eminently lisible. And while utilizing the insights of contemporary French criticism, it is given to none of the latter's oraculousness and
ponderous philosophizing. It is to be hoped that tlus book will contribute
to that process, now underway, to do for Michelet what modern English
oritics have done for Gibbon, that is to say, teach us the value of his " literature"
when we have dismissed Ius" science."
HAYDEN WmTE

Wesleyan University

Cultural Tbenza,ics: Tbe Formation of 'be Faustian E,bos by T. K. Seung.
New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976. Pp. xviii
$16.50.

+

283.

Some books are particularly embarrassing to review because they deal with
important questions in silly ways. In this book T. K. Seung, a philosopher by
trade, goes slumming in the world of literary history and theory, apparently
without realizing that literary studies need not combine overbearing pretension with scant regard either to texts or to the development of a coherent
argument. The ambitious thesis and innovative methodology he announces in
his opening pages are never demonscrated in the chapters on Dante, medieval
theology, Petrarch, and Boccaccio that follow. For the record, his prefatory
argument is that the transformation of the "medieval ethos" into the "modern
ethos" can usefully be seen in terms of a series of attempts, dating from the
twelfth century, to resolve a conflict between sacred and secular interests implicit in the originally totalizing notion of universal hierarchy. This conflict,
Seung says, originates for the medieval world in the work of the fifth-century
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Neoplatonist Pscudo-Dionysius, whose radical monism endowed the physical
universe with new ontological significance. .fu> Seung would have it, when
the influence of Augustine's linguistically oriented N eoplatonism began to wane
in the twelfth century, the "Dionysian conflict)) assumed center stage, acted
out first in a cycle constituted by Bonaventure, Aquinas, and Duns Scotus, and
again, more fatefully, by Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio.
Though the dramatic metaphor is only casually invoked, ncar the end of
the book, it suggests an alternative to materialist and mechanistic models of
cultural change. The study of "cultural thematics" Seung advocates can be
justified as an investigation of the extent to which the creative play and the
shaping power of symbolic systems themselves govern the course of cultural
change. Seung does not, however, push this metaphor very far. He never
actually shows the dialogue going on between one text and another. Similarly,
though he suggests that the process he wishes to describe might have a
musical structure, he never says which musical structure and, in fact, misses
seeing Petrarch's brilliant retrograde inversions of Dante. In other words, the
suggestion is there for anyone who wishes to pursue it, but Seung himself
neither justifies the metaphors with examples, nor exploits them in support of
the conceptual and procedural preoccupations he mentions at the beginning of
the book. Instead he simply leaves it that the "constant interplay of existential
themes or motifs" in a cultural tradition consdtutes a new object of inquiry.
A second suggestion is that such an inquiry allows the literary artifacts of
an historically remote period to be understood in a way relatively free of
modern biases. One of his chief concerns in devising his method, he says, is
to hold the interpreter's own cultural context in abeyance: for instance, the
thea centrism of medieval writing and the medieval way of being in the world
is to be taken more seriously than he feels modern interpretative methods have
allowed. (Why he insists upon reading works of Petrarch and Boccacci0'1
which he himself regards as transitional, in terms of a rigid conception of the
medieval Christian world view remains a mystery, to which I will have to
return.) Riding the issue of modern parochialism very hard, he says that he
intends to use the analytical tools bequeathed by Heidegger and Wittgenstein~
burt in a way that corrects for the "ahistorical limitation" of phenomenology
and the "errors of ... contextual naivete" to which linguistic analysis has
been prone. In spite of these claims, however, he does not consider the
possibility that the kind of transition he wishes to investigate might involve
changes in the very processes of signification, that an incipient shift in cultural
perspective might be registered more immediately in formal structures than
in thematic content. He never, in fact, questions his own assumptions about
the locus of meaning, assuming throughout the book that every writer's
relationship to, or use of, language is pretty much the same. The appeal to
Heidegger and Wittgenstein is misleading. No further reference, implicit or
explicit, is made to them in the body of the book.
In practice Seung is hardly more engaged with the literary and theological
texts on whose behalf he purports to be writing than he is with the theoretical
issues he raises so portentously. Breaking his O"wn rules, he relies exclusively
on English translations, many of them far from literal and all of them open to
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the charge of embodying the very biases against which he has warned. Surprisingly he does not even include references to definitive original language
editions (only an occasional dual-language text) in the notes or bibliography.
This omission is illogical on all counts. It belies Seung's interest in this particular
material. It creates unnecessary difficulties for the researcher interested in pursuing
the inquiry. It suggests that Seung has not in fact given much thought, as
someone concerned with cultural differences presumably would, to what
happens in the course of translating, not only from one time to another, but
from one language to another.
Seung's commentary on the texts he sets out to reexamine is heavily indebted
to twentieth-century literary criticism and histories of philosophy, again
despite his supposed mistrust of modem interpretative habits. His excesses in
marshalling other critics to corroborate the most elementary observations make
tedious reading. Worse, he is capable of clumsy misalignments between text
and commentary. On one occasion, for example, Seung argues:
Petrarch's oscillation between the heavenly and the earthly poles of
his existence appears to be reflected in the perpetual fluctuation of his
moods. Robert M. Durling has called our attention to this fluctuation
in his fine study of Petrarch's Rime. 28 He regards the Rime as Q
cumulative record of Petrarch's shifting moods. He is fascinated with
the continuous mutation of Petrarch's mood from moment to moment
and says, "His state varies abruptly from the extreme of hopelessness to
manic joy." 29 Here are two sonnets that illustrate this abrupt change ....
As Petrarch anticipates, his mood changes in a short while from despondency to ecstasy.
(pp. 132-33)
The final tercet of the "despondent" poem goes as follows:
Go, you are safe, because Love comes with us;
And wicked fortune may decline and pass,
If the signs of my sun predict the air.
The" ecstatic" sonnet begins:
I saw on earth angelic manners show;
Heavenly beauties, in the world, alone,
So that recalling them is joy and woe,
For it seems shadow, smoke or dream that shone.
The first is, in faot, the more hopeful, forward-looking poem; the second is
ambivalent and nostalgic. Furthermore, these two sonnets, 153 and 156, do
not represent an abrupt transition, although there are others that do, but
belong to a series of lyric moments in which the emotional shifts (marldng a
movement from the present situation into imagination and memory) are
gradual and clearly motivated. Even the unsatisfactory translations by Anna
Maria Armi that Seung uses here are reliable in showing this much. Nevertheless,
Seung's discussion of the Rime is all the more inadequate because the subtlety
and significance of Petrarch's poetry lie as much in its technical featuresrhyme, syntax, paratactic structures, contrapuntal designs-as in any translatable
narrative content. Seung offers no account of where Armi's translations fall
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short of the originals. TIle remainder of his superficial treatment of the
Rime passes from a brief discussion of paradox to a polemic against New
Critical readings of Dante!
Larger, more drastic errors abolll1d as do more trivial ones. The discussion of
Augustine is a travesty, typified by such remarks as, "The ultimate guideline
Augustine offers for the reading of the Holy Scripture in De doctrina christiana
can be summed up in one sentence: 'the true spirit of the Bible is in its
literal sense.''' vVhatever the advisability of "summing up" one of the
richest texts in the history of interpretation theory, D. W. Robertson's translation of the De doctrina, cited by Seung, unequivocally contradicts this
assertion:
Nor can anything more appropriately be called the death of the soul
than that condition in which the thing which distinguishes us from
beasts, which is the understanding, is subjected to the flesh in pursuit
of the letter.... There is a miserable servitude of the spirit in this habit
of taking signs for things, so that one is not able to raise the eye of
the mind above things that are corporal and created to drink in eternal
light (On Christian Doctrine, bk. 2, chap. 5).
I think Scung has confused Augustine's focus on language with literal-mindedness
in setting up his own opposition between linguistically and materially oriented
theology, but this is making the case more clearly than it is made in the book.
COffilPounding such primordial confusions, Seung also deals carelessly with his
secondary sources. Some of his inadequate and misleading attributions mask
from himself as well as from the reader certain questions which are much to
the point. In characterizing the figure of Laura in the Trionfi, for instance, he
refers to a description in Thomas Bergin's Petrcrrch, where, however, Bergin
is not speaking of the Trionfi but rather of the Rime. Bergin does not suggest
that the two Lamas are interchangeable. In fact, their differences are
indicative of the vastly different poetic strategies by which the two works are
governed. Other slips merely call into question the general attentiveness of
Seung's reporting. In a discussion of the Africa Seung cites Aldo Bernardo's
Petrctrch, Scipio, and the Africa at a point where Bernardo's subject happens
to be the De remediis utriusque fortunae. In a third instance Bergin is not
cited as the source of a position with which Seung disagrees. Instead, again
frustrating the interested researcher, this ,position (like many others throughout
the book) is attributed to certain unidentified" others."
There are many other mistakes and misconstructions which mar his argument,
but this catalogue is already discouraging. One would not expect Seung to
succeed by these means in locating the shift in perspective he is looking for,
and, indeed, he does not. Instead he vacillates eccentrically between censuring
"the Petrarchan siclmess" or "the Boccaccian man" for bringing on the
ills of modernity, and insisting, on the contrary, that these writers had no part
in the affair, that the only difference between them and their theological
forbears II lies in their historical context." Ironically, the structure of a substantive change Seung might have disclosed has been successfully investigated
by one of the scholars whom he treats offhandedly. In an unpublished Yale
Ph.D. dissertation and in an article, "Ser Ciappelletto.: A Reader's Guide to
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the Deccrmeron" (Hunlanities Association Re·view/La "evue de l'associcrtion des
bumanites, Winter 1975), l\1illicent I\1arcus offers a detailed analysis of Boccaccio's
departure from the norms of traditional didactic narrative which, I think, serves
Seung's purposes much better than his own attempt to assimilate Boccaccio to
the mainstream of medieval didacticism. He seems not to have grasped the
significance of her worle. Taking her analysis as the straw man in his own
discussion of the tale of SeI Ciappelletto, he metamorphoses her into yet
another group of "some" critics-" Some have claimed ... ," "Some might
fear ..• ," II Some may be disturbed ... ," etc.-and inaccurately identifies this
reading as the II usual way of responding to the story." Apparently he is not
very familiar with Boccaccio studies, and, on top Df that, he cannot recognize
his own concerns clothed in someone else's idiDm.
Seung's own idiom, finally, calls for some comment. Stylistically it resembles that of Charles Atkinson's Englished Spengler, and the resemblance is
no accident. Seung has tacitly taken Spengler as his model cultural historian.
The Decline of tbe TVest is, of course, a fascinating artifact, but Spengler's
mode of discourse-his tendency to reify his perceptions in abstract nouns and
to discuss these abstractions as if they were themselves historical fDrces-is
his weakest point. He is read for his informing imagination, not for his
pDsitivistic conceptual system. Seung, however, seems to have taken Spengler's
enabling apparatus for the structure of truth itself. He has, at any rate,
coerced his material into a peculiarly Spenglcrian mold which is inimical to
open"",ended investigation. The moral Df the story Seung tells becomes simply
and solely that H the Boccaccian man seems to fulfill all the essential condition~
for being what Spengler ... !has called the Faustian man." Without questioning
the usefulness of such terms or the ontology of the pattern Spengler thought he
saw, Seung concludes, "The emergence of the Faustian tradition is the transformation of the Dionysian into the Boccaccian ethos" (emphasis mine). This
conclusion is just not interesting enough to warrant so much bypassing of rich
and complex texts. Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio demand a great deal of the
twentieth-century reader because, as Seung initimates, they have much to offer.
His misguided emulation of Spengler and his unconscionably sloppy scholarship
combine to deprive what should have been an important study of any appreciable
theoretical or philological value.
MARGUERITE

R.

WALLER

Amberst College

Autobiographical Acts: The Changing Situation of a Literary Genre by Eliza~
beth W. Bruss. Pp. 184. Baltimore and London: TIle Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1976. $10.00.
Elizabeth Bruss seeks to show "how autobiography can be at once one and
many, different and the same (p. 7) "; she describes, as the subtitle to Autobiographical Acts puts it, "the changing situation of a literary genre." Her
means for doing so is in large part convincing. A genre, she affinns, is an
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"illocutionary act," "an association between a piece of language and certain
contexts, conditions, and intentions (p. 5)." Given this initial equation, she
can reconcile the one and the many. We understand-or begin to-how the
various intentions and assumptions of autobiographers develop within a
delimiting context of "self-evaluation (p 13)."

Bruss's approach to autobiography is carefully, promisingly set out in the
introduction. Only on the last page of the introduction does a confusion of
potential significance seem to threaten her argument. She is to consider in
detail four autobiographies, four distinct illocutionary acts. She is also-it is
abruptly announced-to consider four contrasting works. Grace Abounding will
be set against Pilgrim's Progress, Boswell's London Journal against the Life of.
f ohnson, and so on. The argument, therefore, sp'reads in two directions simultaneously. We learn, from chapter to chapter, about the historical development
of autobiography~about the range of variation possible in tIus particular illocutionary context. kt the same time, we are presented with a group of case
studies, showing how a writer can navigate his way between genres. These
lines of development are closely related; nonetheless, they should not be
treated as the same argument. To do so, as Bruss usually does, is to open the,
way to some annoying confusions.
Considered as independent units, the four central chapters (on Bunyan,
Boswell, DeQuincey, and Nabokov) are satisfying. Here, the emphasis is
heavily on distinctions between genres. A passage from De Quincey's Autobiographical Sketches, for example, is juxtaposed with an excerpt from Suspiria de
Profundis wluch is identical almost to the word. Bruss then shows that the
apparently similar passages perform different functions. The differences,
signalled by unobtrusive changes in wording, are finally generic. DeQuincey's
particular concept of aU'tobiography can be defined in contrast to his concept of,
prose poetry. The account of Suspiri« is orthodox (d. J. Hillis Miller's Th:e
Disappearance of God); the distinctions between this work and the Sketches
are convincing and original. Similarly with other chapters: the strategy of
contrast and comparison works to fine advantage.
This is not to say that the explications are flawless. The Bunyan chapter
pays little or no attention to allegory, that indispensable method of representing mental facts. One necd not be a scholar of the seventeenth century,
only a reader of The Allegory of Love, to see that Bruss has missed the, boat
here-that she has said true things much more complexly than was nece;sary~
In the N abokov chapter, a different sort of problem arises. Bruss emphasizes
the place of bOtIl historical situation and authorial intention in the development of autobiography. How surprising, then, that she neglects to place
Humbert Humbert in a landscape, to show his self-deceptions and self-assertions
as created partly from his confrontation with the United States: widows, highways, tennis courts, motels, and all. TIllS" parody" of autobiography, as she.
calls it, is based largely on the situation of the man in an alien culture~
Nabokov's manipulation of our feelings about Humbert and his fantasies are tied
up closely with the juxtaposition of sensibility and place. TIlis autobiographical act has its own peculiar logic-not merely the logic of a decayed
romanticism (DeQuincey gone to seed) but the logic of such a romanticism
grappling with post-World War II America.

BOOK REVIEWS

369

The basic problem, though, is not inaccurate explication. With most of
Bruss's energy in these chapters going to the contrast of autobiography with
other genres, we tend to lose sight of the continuity-or lack of it-between
one autobiography and another. At the beginning of chapters three, four, and
five there arc paragraphs which show how Grace Abounding compares with
the London Journal, and so ani at the end of the boole, Bruss makes a brief
attempt to elaborate on these paragraphs, to show, in a kind of overview, how
autobiography has changed while remaining the same. Much can be learned
from these passages; however, by the standard Bruss, sets in her introduction"
they do not provide a satisfactory account of "the changing situation of a
literary genre." VVhat they do provide are some potted comments 011 the
zeitgeist, which we mayor may not be willing to accept. Is it true, for instance,
that in the Romantic period "the newly-glimpsed profundity of spontaneous
subjective life trivializes autobiography as a genre (p. 96)"? It would be
instructive to correlate this comment "vith Karl Weintraub's claim that" Autobiography assumes a significant cultural function around A. D. 1800," when there
arose H that particular modern form of historical mindedness we call historism
Of historicism (Critical Inquiry, June 1975, 821)." The point is not that either
Bruss or Weintraub must be wrong; they may both, in fact, turn out to be
correct, if we understand the terms and context of each discussion properly.
Unfortunately, Bruss does not give us sufficient data to grasp the meaning of
her statement. Is it, on the most elementary level, a statement about DeQuincey
in particular or Romanticism in general?
Bruss's account of autobiography's "changing situation" is as much a matter
of implication-of those mysterious spaces between the chapters-as of explicit
statement. She suggests some fascinating themes: the life-span of literary
conventions (when and how do they wear out?), the tendency of related genres
to borrow from each other, the interaction of individual intention and cultural
situation. Never, though, do we get a coherent synthesis. Bruss has troubl~
building toward general statements to the very end; in the last pages, sh~
maintains that autobiography, by its nature, discourages sequential narrative.
Tills observation seems to be as unnecessarily prescriptive as some she condenms.
Many autobiographers use discontinuous structure powerfully, but a number of
important writers (I would suggest Gosse and Newman) narrate an orderly set
of events precisely as a means of "self-evaluation'.' Bruss would have been
well-advised to return, in her conclusion, to the illocutionary rules she sets up
in the introduction (pp. 10-11).
I will make a last criticism, concerning the linguistic concepts which inform
the book Bruss says that a genre is, or is like, an illocutionary act. Chapter
two C' From Act to Text") catalogues "some linguistic markers sensitive to
context (p. 31) "; it shows, that is, how choice of mood, tense and case give
us clues to the nature of a literary work. Apparently, then, an illocutionary;
act (autobiogr~phy) can contain thousands of miniature illocutionary acts
(questions, reminiscences, exclamations). It would have been good to hear
more on this subject. How does one jump from a momentary linguistic gesture
to a cohesive autobiographical statement: is the critic supposed to categorize,
individual sentences and then come to a conclusion about the work as a whole;
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does he start with an intuition about general form and then look for small
clues; is there something that makes one sentence morc significant as a clue than
another? Given the aspirations of Autobiographical Acts, these methodological
questions need answers urgently. Without such answers, we arii likely to be
confused about proper units of analysis. Not only do the work as a whole
and its syntactic building-blocks seem to exist on the same level of perception
(both are illocutionary acts) but the relationship between them is obscure.
Autobiograpbical Acts is a good book which cannot quite live up to the
standards it sets itself. Its openness and vigor make it one of the few sensible
studies of autobiography; morc than solving problems, however, it clears the
way for future solutions. Bruss asks us to think coherently about the pitfallsand rewards of genre criticism; her application of linguistic philosophy to this
exacting activity often works in practice, even where she has failed to control
the development of her own argument. The achievement is considerable; it is
also to be treated with caution.
RICHARD MAXWELL

Valparaiso University

Wordsworth's" Naturalll'IethodiS112" by Richard E. Brantley. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1975. Pp. xvi + 205. $10.95.
Among his many self-portraits in the 1805 version of The Prelude, Wordsworth characterizes himself in the guise of Bunyan'S Christian as "a Pilgrim
gone/In quest of highest truth." The image reinforces the generally accepted
idea of a direct line of poetic descent between Milton and other Orristian
writers of the seventeenth century and the first generation of British Romantic
poets. But there is less consensus as to the precise significance of this connection
and the kind of "highest truth" sought. Concerning Wordsworth in particular
it is admitted that his poetry is suffused with religious language and attests to a
Christian framework dating back to Augustine's Confessions. However, a
question which still vexes debate is whether Wordsworth is primarily a poet
of Christian myth and value or the precursor of a more secular orientation and
religious skepticism.
Most critics today tend to support the second of these positions. As presented by Ernest Tuveson, M. H. Abrams, and Geoffrey Hartman, tlus argument
holds that Wordsworth recognized the threat posed by Locke's demythologized
universe and sought to counter that outlook by reaffirming an intimate marriagCt
between nature and the mind of man. But this emendation of Milton's" Paradise
witlun" was to be, in Wordsworth's words, "a simple product of the common
day" realized through the imagination as a fo-rm of unmediated "grace." As
Abrams has made clear, the sphere of reference thus shifts from the supernatural to the natural, or to what Carlyle termed "natural supernaturalism." In
seeking to "arouse the sensual from their sleep/Of death," Wordsworth was
reconstituting traditional concepts of theology and redefining eschatology as a
process of the poetic imagination. As seen by these commentators, then,
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Wordsworth is essentially a poet who prefigures the inquiring spirit and
revisionist tendency of a. later age.
Richard Br~tley adopts quite a different approach and emphasis. Preferring.
a theologica~ ~and historical method of criticism to a philosophic one, he
realizes that he "swim[s] against a strong current of fashion" (p. 1) by
proposing that Wordsworth is not simply a Christian poet but in fact an,
exponent of Evangelical Anglicanism and Evangelical Nonconformism. If we
accept this dissenting view, our reading of Wordsworth and our estimate of
his achievement alter considerably. Yet such revaluation, claims Brantley, is
warranted: "We cannot fully enter into the spirit of -his poems without
realizing that he endeavored to remythologize his Q1ristian heritage and that;
he thus participated, as did the Evangelicals, in the revival and not the
secularization or rejection of Christian myth and morality (for which he never
found and seldom sought a substitute)" (p. 2).
This thesis would be less exceptional if Brantley were referring only to the,
Wordsworth who, from approximately 1810 until his death in 1850, embraced
an increasingly conservative ecclesiology and gave his endorsement to the
Oxford Movement. However, Brantley takes a broader and less sanctioned view.
He is concerned to demonstrate the integrity of the poet's career and refute
the usual charge made against Wordsworth of "an unfortunate conversion
from a praiseworthy epistemological skepticism to a pious and complacent
orthodoxy" (p.77). Toward this end he suggests that the young Wordsworth
was deeply affected by the evangelism of the reformers John Wesley, William
Wilberforce, and Francis Wran.gham. Their ideals of spiritual self-examination,
experiential faith, practical charity, individual covenant-making, and "sincerity"
appealed to the poet whose later work The Excursion-the main sanctuary of
Wordsworth's" gothic church" in verse-Charles Lamb praised for its "natural
methodism."
The impact of the Great Awakening, Brantley conjectures, might well have
reached Wordsworth while he was yet a boy at Cockermouth in the Lake
District, where Wesley and other itinerant preachers are Imown to have toured
frequently. But it was during his undergraduate years at Cambridge, long
a citadel of religious toleration and then a center for the Evangelical revival, that
Wordsworth in 1788 is said to have experienced a "call" to the kind of fervent
faith advocated by such ministers as Charles Simeon, John Berridge, and Rowlan~
Hill. Wordsworth's subsequent sojourn in France from November of 1791 to
December of 1792, when his republican sympathies were checked by the September massacres in Paris and Jacobin exetremism, is treated as a symbolic crisis in
Wordsworth's spiritual biography. Brandey, however, does not discuss a passage
in The Prelude in which Wordsworth admits that at this time he "lost/All
feeling of conviction" and "wearied out with contrarieties,lYielded up moral
questions in despair." Presumably, Wordsworth's despair over all precepts,
judgments, maxims, creeds" amounted to only a temporary apostasy, giving
way by 1795 to the restorative influence of Dorothy Wordsworth and Coleridge. For this we have the poet's own testimony, though some have suspected
that he never completely overcame his fear of skepticism and solipsism.
Brantley is at his best when ,examining the structural and thematic affinities
between Methodist and Puritan autobiographies and Wordsworth's personal
(l
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epic on the "Gro\\'1:h of a Poet's Mind," as The Prelude is subtitled. Although
forced to infer Wordsworth's familiarity with such narratives, Brantley reveals
how the pattern of youthful error followed by repentance and conversion
leading to spiritual maturity and the quest for perfection is replicated in the
organization of Wordsworth's poem around epiphanic " spots of time." These
analogues persuade him that Wordsworth recognized "the apotheosized and,
apotheosizing vision" (p. 93). Stressing the continuity of Wordsworth's worldview, he also offers brief but interesting interpretations of some of the.
shorter poems, as well as of TlJe Excursion which he compares to Bunyan's
Grace Abounding. Perhaps the least instructive section of Brantley's book,
however, is that wherein he attempts to relate Wordsworth's conception of
the sublimity of the animate universe to the Evangelicals' figurative reading of
the "Book of Nature." What the poet portrays as "all this mighty sum/Of
things for ever speaking" is reduced to "a system of pictorialized morality"
(p. 154) and "naturalized emblemology" (p. 166). Few would deny that
Vvordsworth's vision encompassed the typology of Evangelical thought, but
they might not agree that the artist's eye, along with the element of pantheism
in his work, can be subordinated so strictly to a natural theology.
The final issue implicitly raised by Brantley'S study concerns the nature of
vVordsworth's commitment as a poet. We are told that poetry for him involved
a "clear moral purpose" (p. 14) and that his poetic identity" derives from
a religious ideal of service" (IP. 36). But does this way of regarding the artis~
in relation to his work help to explain why the Wordsworth who in 1791.
declined ordination in the Church of England and whose religious outlook
Coleridge described as " semi-atheism" chose to become a poet? Brantley docs
show very effectively that Wordsworth was indebted to a tradition of radical
Protestantism, that he affiliated both with Evangelicalism and with Anglicanism,
and that, like Wesley, he was syncretistic. This laSt point is made when the
author remarks that vVordsworth "poetically achieved a coalescing or interpenetration of subject and object," drawing on both epistemology and theology
<l to
show how language leads outside the self and affirms a reality beyond"
(p. 55). But docs this" reality beyond" necessarily coincide with that conception of the noumenal postulated in the Christian schema? Moreover, Wordsworth often seems to discover in language itself, or poesis, an autonomous and
redemptive act of the imagination: "visionary power," he says in Book V
of The Prelude, "attends the motions of the viewless winds,jEmbodied in
the mystery of words." If poetry serves to exalt and transfigure the world of
experience, vVordsworth must continue to be. seen from a larger perspective.
than Brantley provides.
Nowhere, though, docs Brantley argue that Wordsworth is merely an
apologist for Christian doctrine. Emphasizing as he does the consistent spiritual
idiom and symmetry of vVordsworth's poetry in a "neoapostolic" age, he has
done much to correct T. E. Hulme's simplistic notion of Romanticism as being,
"spilt religion" and opened a fresh ayenue of inquiry to one of its major
figures. 'Vhether he has given us "the basis for a synoptic criticism" (p. xi)
of \Vords\\'onh, ho\\'eycr, remains to be seen.
ROBERT LANCE SNYnER

TVake Forest

UnhH:rsity
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Tbe Pessimism of Thomas Hardy by G. W. Sherman. Rutherford, N.
Dickinson University Press, 1976. Pp. 518. $22.50.

J.:

Fairleigh

G. W. Sherman's study of Tbe Pessimism of Thomas Hardy indeed stimulates interest in 'a specific but very important aspect of Hardy's work. It
seems that Sherman immediately faced a problem as he was getting his project
under way: whether he should study the "pessimism" of Hardy in all his
wor1{s, or in a representative sampling of each kind of his writing (novels, the
short stories, the lyric poetry, The Dynasts), or in an unrepresentative sampling
of his works to try to prove either optimism or pessimism (pp. 404-5).
Sherman concluded correctly, albeit ambitiously, that a "fair-minded appraisal
should be based on all his work" (p. 405).
Shennan is thought provoldng because he measures Hardy with marxist
criticism-Marx's proletarian principles of economics and politics. To my
knowledge, this has not been done in a full-length study. Whether the measurement really discovers what Sherman claims and seeks to demonstrate is the
key point on which the success of the book rests. The scheme of his study
is certainly comprehensive of Hardy's works. In the first chapter, " A Critic of
Critics," Sherman asserts that he will be both a critic of Hardy'S writings anq.
">2 critic of his critics" ([p. 23), the total undertaking of which is truly
ambitious. The second and third chapters are effective in their depiction of
cultural and biographical background in "Wessex II country and in London
respectively. Sherman then treats the Wessex novels, the" London Novels,"
constancy and change in a chapter by that name, the lyric poetry, and The
Dynasts, in that order.
On the second page of his study, Sherman states his thesis: "The cause of
his [Hardy's] pessimism ·was not his loss of faith in God from having read
Darwin's Origin of Species as a young man, but his loss of faith in the leaders
of society, both VVhig and Tory alike, after 1867" (p. 24). In anotherl
instance, he asserts that Hardy realized l< that the ruling classes had learned
nothing and forgotten nothing from the lessons of the Napoleonic Wars in
their conquest for control of the world market" (p. 34). In yet another
instance, he alludes to the" agricultural malaise, which was the source of Hardy's
pessimism and his concern in the Wessex novels" (p. 43). The firSt really
perplexing matter for the reader is the author's lack of clear definition of pessimism.
He alludes to Darwin's theory of evolution, which has an antecedent in Classical
Epicureanism, a philosophy which has joy and optimism associated with the
popular version of it; pessimism is a philosophy in which reality is looked on
as essentially evil and which is associated with Schopenhauer more than with
Darwin; frustration and gloom from observing social and economic injustice
(which appear to be what Sherman means by pessimism) could hardly be.
construed as a philosophical stance. If Sherman means philosophical pessimism,
the tradition of criticism is against him. One critic after another sees a
Schopenhauerian stance only in such novels as Tess and Jude. And Sherman's
correlations of social and economic positions of Hardy with marxist positions are
often times very far-fetched.
Sherman's absolutist position regarding Hardy and pessimism should not be
taken without consideration of other critics' judgments. Sherman declares:
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"There is no question in anyone's mind but what [sic] Hardy was a pessimist..."

(p. 23). W. P. Trent in The Sewanee Review (November, 1892) says that
H,ardy in drawing T egg II kept his eye fixed upon...nobleness" and thereby!
submerged" his realism in idealism, his pessimism in optimism." D. F. Hannigan

in The Westminister Review (January, 1896) writes of Hardy's "apparent
pessimism" in contrast to vulgar-minded optimists who proceed by the method,.
of hook or crook. An anonymous reviewer of The Dynasts for The Edinburgh
Review (April, 1908) sees Hardy's '" pessimism" as essentially Carlyle's Natural
Supernaturalism and concludes that in action the poet-novelist " preaches,
against his own pessimistic theories." F. MalU1ing in The Spectator (September"
1912) observes that the poet's pessimism" is only a habit of thought, a weariness
with life that comes 11lPon all of us sometimes," and that it "springs from his
sympathy with mankind." Commenting on Jude, Charles Whibley in Blackwood's Magazine (June, 1913) asserts that a "man is not a pessimist because he
perceives the obvious truth that all is not cakes and ale in the world." (The
above positions may be found in Tho'flZiIS Hardy: The Critical Heritage, ed.
R. G. Cox). Very recently, Paul Zietlow in Victorian Studies (March, 1971)
declares that it is "not only the act of artistic resurrection which redeems
Tess, but her saving human qualities as well." And it is well knmvn that Hardy
himself disavowed the tag of pessimism along with other systems of philosophy
that were sometimes wrongly ascribed to him.
Sherman's problem with philosophy in Hardy's writings, however, does not
nullify the value of the book. Sherman obviously has stndied Hardy's novels
thtoughly and devotedly, beginning with the lost or destroyed Tbe Poor Man
and the Lady and including the masterpieces: FaT From tbe Madding Crowd,
The Return of tbe Native, Tbe MayO'/' of Casterbridge, The Woodlanders, Tess
of the D'Urbervilles, and Jude tbe Obscure. His chapter on the lyric poetry
strikes me as his most sustained criticism; he approaches the huge body of
lyrics mostly from the vantage point of themes-love, Nature, society or social
intercourse, occasions, philosophy, to name some-and allows his overall pro~
lletarian thesis to intervene relatively little; he mars somewhat this good chapter
on lyric poetry by declaring in one instance that Hardy "valued people more
than Nature" (p. 272) and in another that the IPoet felt that "Nature is
,better than Society" (p. 286). Sherman evaluates The Dynasts extensively but
he may be self-defeating in one instance at least regarding his proletarian
thesis; he says that the poem must be judged not so much as a traditional epic,
but as poetry which is consonant with the age-the age of Darwin, Marx,
Wundt, Einstein, Krupp's cannon, Enfield rifles, Nobel's dynamite, Roentgen's
x-rays, and aerial photography (p. 299); in cultural purport, more of these are
bourgeois than proletarian-a point that Sherman does not explain. In fact,
Donald Davie in Thoma! Hardy and British p()(!try (1972) sees the middle class
Victorian drive for success as a major characteristic of Hardy's lyric poetry;
Davie's book would indeed have been instructive reading for Shennan.
Sherman's style is vigorous, but there are some typographical slips: Turgenev's
Fathers and Children (p. 149), the "Rosettis" (po 318), and a paragraph ended
with a comma (p. 413). A clear distinction should be made between Hardy's
first wife and his second (pp. 286, 289, 292, 295, 296 contain examples); the
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index is inadequate he.te. The index is also inadequate in its fifty-seven pag~
entries under Marx; I found twenty-nine allusions to him in a single chapter,
"London."
In terms of the thesis of pessimism in Hardy set forth as caused by a loss
of faith in economic and political leaders of his day, a proletarian stance,.
Sherman's study is not very impressive or successful. His measuring rodsJeveloped out of Marx and Engel's economic and political principles-many
times overshadow the objects measured.
JAMES

D.

\VOOLF

Indiana University-Purdue University
Fort Wayne

Victorian Heretic: Mrs. HU111phry lVard's "Robert Elsmere" by William S.
Peterson. Leicester, England: Leicester University Press, 1976. Pp. x + 259.
£3.50 (New York: Humanities Press, $8.00.)
Speaking metaphorically, we may call Professor Peterson's book a nonfiction bildungsroman of one sprawling novel (the story of a priest who- loses
his Anglican faith, resigns his living, goes into London's East End, and helps
establish a new Theistic religion). Peterson studies how the fledgling novel was
shaped in the earlier life of the earnest, scholarly granddaughter of Dr. Thomas
Arnold, how it laboriously acquired its never-quite-finished form during three
years of authorial groping, overextending, and desperate pruning, how it quickly
and controversially attained vast circulation, how it made its author, in her
:middle thirties, famous and wealthy, and then how it irreversibly altered her
life, in some respects for the worse. Peterson explains that his book is not
a biography: he deliberately brackets" large periods and major interests," and
presents only "those aspects of her intellectual and spiritual history which bear
directly on Robert Elsmere" (p. 15).
At appropriate places Peterson proves to be a discerning critic, but the
greater part of his book is historical, based upon extensive research in previously
neglected documents. His bibliography lists more than a hundred titles of Mrs.
Ward's non-fiction publications. He cites numerous letters, diaries, and other
manuscripts scattered in various libraries, British and American. The writing
is clear and the development is economical.
Peterson lets novel and nov:clist, while retaining their particularity, exemplify
a "bittersweet quality of Victorian religious nostalgia ... a moving, vivid
human account of what it meant to go out into the wilderness of unbelief in the
last century" (pp. 12, 13). For .Mrs. Ward the road to that wilderness had
run through briery historical research. A youthful disciple of the erudite
skeptic Mark Pattison (model for Squire Wendover, who exacerbated Elsmere's
doubts), she had become an authority on early Spanish literature. Assigned the
Spanish articles for Henry Wace's Dictionary of Christian Biography, she
struggled to translate "the wimess of those centuries ... into the historical
language of our own day ... closer to the realities of things" (quoted p. 92).
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In the novel, Elsmere does research in medieval French, not Spanish, history.
Trying to extricate truth from myth and legend leads Elsmere, as it had previously led his creator, to disbelieve New Testament miracles, particularly
the Resurrection.
Elsmere's unbelief grieves his orthodox wife. Mrs. Ward had feared her
heterodoxy would distress her deeply loved father, Thomas Arnold, whose two
troubled conversions to Rome had cost him his Oxford career and ultimately
his family. Peterson's most poignant pages are those treating the daughterfather relationship. He attributes Mary's liberal theology to her grandfather
and her Uncle 1\1atthew, but credits her father with her" essentially religious
temperament .,. a constant factor in her personality" Cp.41). Her "feelings
of guilt and anxiety" about him lay behind "her life-long effort ... to persuade
us that all who feel a hunger for God, whatever their creed, worship the same
Deity" (p. 42).
Still, the novel makes it seem uncannily simple for new disbelievers to find
a spiritually s2.~isfying substitute. Apparently lVIrs. Ward herself never owned
to any essential loss of faith, but claimed only a broadening into what Peterson
aptly terms
her reverent, quasi-Christian Theism" Cp. 84). Quickly and
comparatively cheerfully, Elsmere begins preaching the human Christ and a
Theism which cannot be discredited by historical research" Cp. 149). Throughout a dramatically presented chapter he courageously lectures to a potentially.
unruly audience of East End anti-religionists on "The Claim of Jesus upon
Modern Life." Mrs. Ward thought her best work was in the third volume,
which sets forth Elsmere's reconstructed Christianity. Peterson disagrees:
"Elsmere, never a strong personality, is flattened into an instrument of propaganda" Cp. 152). But these final episodes, artistically deficient, seem partially
redeemed by essayistic eloquence.
Ironically, neither of the men to whom the Ward-Elsmere Theism owed.
most, T. H. Green and l\1atthew Arnold, would have applauded Elsmere's
leaving the Church. Peterson's vignette of Green, admitted prototype of Mr,
Grey in Robert EIS11l.ere, tantalizes us to Imow him better-a metaphysician
whose "catholicity (or perhaps confusion of outlook) II (p. 78) "enabled
Evangelicals, Anglo-Catholics, and Theists alike to claim him as their own "
Cp. 77). Although there are some close resemblances between Green's lay
sermons and Arnold's St. Paul and Protestantism, the spiritual fervor 'Mrs. Ward
imparted upon Elsmere probably owed more to Green than to the more
detached Arnold. Mrs. Ward recognized that Arnold, who died before he
could finish her book, would not have liked the outcome, although in
" , Literature and Dogma' he threw out in detail much of the argument suggested,
in (Robert Elsmere'" (quoted PIp. 32, 33). Peterson recalls Arnold's scornful
comparison in "The Function of Criticism" between the meretricious" British,
College of Health" and synthesized "religions of the future." The more
" Hebraic" niece "really absorbed only those ideas from him which were
congenial to her own temperament." In her works Matt's ideas became "conventionalized, attentuated, and at times distorted" (p. 34).
Dr. Thomas Arnold's religious writings were much more complicated than
his son's~if only because he positively believed so much that his son would
(I
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reject. His ideas were often ambiguous, as Peterson justly complains. The
rigorous scholarship he encouraged, confident that it would confinn the revered
essentials of Christianity, including the Incarnation and the Resurrection, led
some of his followers into heterodoxy. But Peterson possibly makes too muchand clarifies too little-of the Doctor's elevating "the authority of moral conscience" or "inward wiOless" over Scriptural authority. Were conscience, or
private judgment, so much more pervasive in his theology than in Protestantism
generally? The then Anglo-Catholic W. G. Ward (he later converted to
Rome) actually accused him of undervaluing moral conscience, particularly in
its sin-convincing role. At least the point concerning "inward witness"
requires more documenting from Dr. Arnold's sermons than one especially
ambiguous statement that II the evidence of Christ's Spirit" is the most powerful
proof of the Resurrection. How distinct is "Christ's Spirit," as Dr. Arnold
used it here, from the Third Person of the Holy Trinity-the" Comforter" that
Jesus promised would come after he himself went away? Elsewhere the Doctor's
sermons are sufficiently evangelical on the Holy Spirit's role in speaking through.
the conscience. Certainly no mere dependence upon "inward witness"
inhibited the Doctor from ceaselessly searching and preaching the Scriptures.
We may find somewhat relevant Eugene L Williamson, Jr.'s explanation of Dr.
Arnold's theological application of Coleridge's famous distinction between
understanding and reason: mere understt1f1tding confinns the historicity of the
Gospels, but only the higher reason, uniquely God-given, can directly intuit
God and bestow a faith with which understanding must not presume to meddle.
Mrs. Ward admitted that Robert Elsmere was rather anachronistic. Robert's
dismayed reaction to historical evidences belonged more to the 1840's than to
the 1880's, when, she explained, "the pressure is distributed from so many
sides, & the alternatives ... so much more attractive and iD:spiring than they
were" (quoted p. 132). And yet the book reflected her O\Vll experiences of
the latter 1870's, and brought fresh news to thousands of intelligent contemporaries. It was broadly true to individual dilemmas that would recur fot
decades to come. More damaging to her book's integrity is ma.fl'lJ5cript evidence
that she first included and then slashed (only partially to appease her ['I1lblisher's
demand for cutting) "frequent and cogent objections" by -Elsmere to
Wendover's skeptical arguments, leaving Robert with "only the most pitiful
sort of resistance." TIle result was "not only a deliberate weakening of the
case for Christianity, as Gladstone and other reviewers complained, but also a.
weakening of Elsmere's character" (p. 124). Robert Elsmere, with all its
excellencies-and it is better written than generally supposed-is finally less a
work of art than of propaganda. A true artist will not deny fictional ch'llracters
the freedom to say what creative imagination dictates they would have said.
JOHN

Andrews University

O.

WALLER
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A'merica1Z Literature: A Study and ReS'em'ch Guide by Lewis Leary. New York~
St. Martin's Press, 1976. Pr. xiv + 185. $10.95 Cloth, $3.95 Paper.
Bibliographical Guide to the Study of tbe Literature of the U S.A. by Clarence.
Gohdes. Fourth edition, revised and enlarged. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1976. Pr. xii + 173. $8.50.
A Field Guide to the Study of Americtm Literature by Harold H. Kolb, Jr.
Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1976. $9.75 Cloth, $4.50 Paper..
Bibliographies of American literature, whether of primary or secondary
material, covering individual writers, genres, specific historical periods, or the
field as a whole, have been appearing with increasing frequency. The main
purpose of these works is, of course, to impose order upon and make accessible
to students and researchers the scholarship which is also proliferating at a
bewildering rate. Lewis Leary, Harold Kolb, and Clarence Gohdes all include
comments in the introductions to their bibliographical guides concerning this
proliferation. Kolb even declares that "Some of the publication, especially in,
the bibliographical field, is duplicative and unnecessary, even irresponsible ..•.
The quality of scholarly criticism is also a topic of increasing concern" (p. x).
Consequently, "The items contained in this bibliography are drastically, if not
desperately and at last even defiantly, selective" (p. xii). Such selectivity is
an important and often underestimated function of the general bibliographical
guide. It makes the bibliographer more than a mere compiler; he performs,
through his selectivity and in his annotations, an important critical service. One
may ask, however, given this "duplicative and unnecessary" publication of
bibliographies, whether the appearance of two new guides to American literature
is justified, since Gohdes' Bibliographical Guide to the Study of the Literature
of the U.S.A., now updated in a fourth edition, has served the same function
so well since its first appearance in 1959. In addition to the question of
duplication of effort, inaccuracies in Leary's guide and organizational weaknesses in Kolb's make the justification for their publication even more doubtful.
Leary has designed his American Literature: A Study and Research Guide
for the undergraduate majoring in literature. In fact, the final 38 pages offer:
helpful advice on "The Research Paper," and Chapter One, "History of the
Study and Teaching of American Literature" (pp. 3-10), presents a succinct
survey of the rise to respectability of American literary studies. In the bibliography itself chapters are included on topics such as "Literary Histories,"
"Suldies in Genre," and" Types and Schools of Criticism," the last introduced
by an elementary and clear discussion of various critical schools. Chapter Ten
(pp. 70-134) includes individual sections on 23 writers and poets. All of this
is organized into paragraphs of related material. Leary asserts his critical
prerogative in his annotations, for, as he asserts in the "Preface," his guide
U lists books and essays that have been of most value to the compiler;
another
person might suggest other sources of instruction or have other things to say
about the materials that are here recommended" (p. vii).
However, the basic inaccuracies in this guide negate its usefulness to a great
extent. Of thirty article entries that I checked, fourteen contained errors,
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including wrong page numbers, dates, volume numbers, titles, and in one case
the wrong author. I found six errors on page 112 alone. I had previously found
similar errors when using Leary's Articles in American LiteratUre 1900-19)0 and
Articles in Americ"" LiteriXtUre, 1950-1967. One must ask how a bibliography,

no matter how well organized and annotated, can sexve the undergraduate
adequately as a guide when it contains suoh basic mistakes. Mter all, the
bibliography is basically an aid to help the researcher locate his material
conveniently and quickly. Few things are as frustrating to him, or as timeconsuming, as an undt1lJendable bibliographical tool.

Hatold Kolb's A Field Guide to the Study of American LiteriXtUre
is directed to a somewhat different audience, primarily the "advanced
undergraduate and graduate . students." He states that sections IV and V,
which list" Editions and Series 71 and" Anthologies," "have been designed with
an eye to the graduate student who will soon be choosing texts for his own
courses in American literature and recommen~ng volumes for purchase by his
school or college library" (p. xi). Appropriately, when Kolb lists PMLA in
Section VI, "Journals," he includes a detailed annotation describing the organization of the Modem Language Association and its American Literature
Section. He also includes sections on "Bibliographies," "Literary History and
Criticism," and "Reference Works." Lengthy annotations follow most entries,
and an "Author, Subject, and Genre Index" concludes the study.
Unfortunately, these annotations, and Kolb's organization, are the guide's
major weaknesses. He states in his "Introduction" that "When possible and
appropriate, the annotation attempts to capture the essential ideas of the work
under discussion and the flavor of their presentation" (p. xi). In attempting
to do this he frequently quotes extensively from the book being cited. The
purpose often seems to be more to capture the "flavor" t~an to express the
"essential ideas," which could often be given more clearly and economically
in paraphrase. At times the purpose is even less clear. When citing Frank
Luther Mott's five-volume A Hist10ry of American Magazin:es, Kolb provides the
following passage from the History as its annotation: " 'The author was at
work on Volume V of his projected six-volume work when he died in
1964.... Mott's daughter, Mildred Mott Wedel, has prepared this [fifth)
volume for publication and provided notes on changes since her father's death.'
Volume V contains a cumulative index to the five volumes" (p. 61). This
annotation says nothing about Mott's methods or the scope of his study, and
since the work is listed under "Literary History and Criticism," a misleading
categorization, an informative annotation is especially needed here. In addition,
comparative judgments should be given when two books are listed that cover
the same field, especially since this guide purports to be defiantly selective.
Kolb lists Alan S. Downer's Fifty Ye",·s of American Drama, 1900-1950 on page
40, and Joseph Wood Ktutch's The American Drama since 1918: An Informal
History on page 52. The annotations consist of quotations from the books
themselves concerning method and intent, and the researcher can discern
differences between them by carefully reading these passages. However, a
direct comparison by Kolb, with a much-needed cross-reference, would have
been more useful and convenient. Kolb also includes in the "Literary History
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and Criticism" section (pp. 25-87) such various and questionable entries as
Herbert W. Schneider's A History of American PiJilosopiJy, Wilbur J. Cash's
The Mind of the South, The Growth of the American Republic by Samuel
Eliot Morison, Henry Steele Cammager, and William E. Leuchtenberg, and
American Studies: Essays on Theory and Metbod, edited by Robert Merideth.
The "Bibliographies" section (pp. 1-24) includes such disparate works as
Charles Evans' American Bibliography, Gohdes' Bibliograpbical Guide to the
Study of tbe Literature of the V.SA., and Merle Johnson's American First
Editions, the last "intended largely as a guide for the rare book collector."
Thomas F. Marshall's An Analytical Index to American Literature (Volumes
I-XXX, Metrch 1929-January 1959) is included, but the more important bibliography of articles published in American Literature itself is unmentioned here.
It is mentioned in the "Journals" section (pp. 113-120) in a description of
American Literature, but the user of the Field Guide could not find this out in
the index, or in any way other than accident. In addition, all entries are
listed in alphabetical order, so that similar works are not grouped together. On
the whole, the structure of this guide does little to further its intent, which,
as Kolb states, -is "to assist the student who, faced with more miles to cover, is
being asked to run them faster" (p. xi).
The organization of Gohdes' guide, on the other hand, and its shorter, more
critical annotations, allow quicker and more convenient access. to its I,OOO-plus
entries. For example, non-literary but related fields are covered in separate
chapters, such as "American studies or American civilization," Book trade
and publishing," and " American history: general tools." Entries within each
chapter are not listed alphabetically, but according to importance and similarity.
For example, Section Five, "Preparation of manuscripts for publication" (pp.
18-19), lists fifteen items, including first the style manuals, then books on
copyright, and finally guides to literary markets. Thus the researcher can
find similar items conveniently grouped together. The annotation to Leo
Marx's The Machine in the Garden shows the concision found throughout the
guide: "The conflict of industrial and pastoral motifs; frequently illustrated in
literary works." Throughout the guide Gohdes notes when an index is unreliable, or when a work is out of date. This critical approach reaches an
extreme in the following annotation to Edwin H. Cady's The Light of the
C01J1'l1t(}n Day: "Ten essays on realism in American fiction which are topped
off by a much needed corrective to the nonsense on the novel perpetrated by
Richard Chase and Leslie Fiedler" (p. 100). Gohdes refuses to list in his
guide, or even mention, Chase's The American Novel and Its Traditions and
Fiedler's Love and Death in tbe American Novel, both prominent studies in the
field. Both Leary and Kolb list them, with thorough annotations, even though
their guides contain fewer entries than Gohdes'. In this instance Gohdes carries
the critical flUlction too far. The user of his guide should be informed of the
existence of these important studies, even if in the annotations Gohdes presents his arguments against them.
Although one may question Gohdes' judgment in this case, the most basic
aspects of his book, its accuracy and its organization, make it a reliable.
convenient, and informative work. The same cannot be said of Leary's and
Kolb's books. Consequently, one must question whether they truly make the
jj
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additional contributions they are purported to make to the field of bibliography,
especially since Gohdes' work already does, and has been doing, the job so

well.

EowARD E.

CHIELENS

Detroit College of Business

Eliot's Early Years by Lyndall Gordon. Oxford and New York:
University Press, 1977. Pp. xiv + 174. 16 ill1a.Strations. $10.00.

Oxford

This is the first full-length biography of T. S. Eliot to be worth serious
scholarly attention. A carefully researched history of the poet's traversal from
his St. Louis Unitarian boyhood to his reception into the Church of England in
1927, it is centered around a reading of the TiT aste Land manuscripts as the
autobiographical document of that passage. The manuscripts, as Gordon reconstructs their order of composition, assemble themselves into a coherently sh~ped
artifact of mind which originates with Eliot's ncar-conversion in 1914 and
takes on its final distinctive form in reaction to his disastrous marriage in 1915.
A different methodological starting point on Gordon's part might, of course,
have led to different conclusions. James E. l\1iller, Jr., for example, in his.
recently published T. S. Eliot's Personal lVaste Land, reads The Waste Land in
the biographical terms of Eliot's friendship with Jean Verdenal, the dedicatee
of Prufrock. But Gordon's reading has preeminently the Ockhamite virtue of
comprehensiveness. It takes more into account than anyone else's. Gordon
has read Eliot's father's unpublished autobiography, Eliot's mother's religious
poems, Eliot's woman-hating undergraduate verses, his wife's short stories
clef and diaries. She has read an enormous amount about the poet, and integrated
it all into a reading of the poet's poem. In one of the photographs that
accompany her text, Eliot in the summer of 1921, when he was on the verge of
The Waste Land, glares into the camera with the face of one of Gericault's madmen. It is a powerful argument in favor of the biographical study of
literary texts.
These favorable things said, it has to be added that the coherences which
Gordon reads into Eliot's biography impose their own limitations on the
reader. It is illuminating to devote three pages to Vivienne Eliot's personality,
for example, but a certain amount of distortion enters the record when Irving
Babbitt, by contrast, receives only one paragraph. In general, we see Eliot the
man and Eliot the poet clearly in Eliot's Early Yecrrs, but Eliot the thinker
drops into virtual invisibility once he has left Harvard. Eliot's Early Years, in
short, is incomplete in a crucial area, and it needs to be supplemented with
such a book as John Margolis' T. S. Eliot's Intellectual Development, 1922-1939.
But Gordon's book, incomplete as it stands, fills the lacunae of all the purely
literary studies of the poet. On its own terms, it is indispensab~e. The
definitive Eliot study -will not be written, presumably, until after Eliot's letters
at Princeton are dc-sequestered in 2020, but while we are waiting for that event,
Eliot's Early Yecrrs will do very well indeed.
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Nathaniel H awthrone: The Poetics of Enchantment by Edgar A. Dryden. Ithaca,
New York: Cornell University Press, 1977. Pp. 182. $10.00.
Reversing Melville's dictum that Hawthorne's moments of "sunlight" are
II bright gildings" playing about the" edges of thunder-clouds," a generation
of moral critics has viewed these clouds as veils, disguising and disclosing •
"light beyond." Edgar A. Dryden's new book, a phenomenological reading of
Hawthorne's texts, is in many respects no different. There is the ideal world of
enchantment which inevitably soldifies and threatens the subjectivity of the
self with its materiality. Since we have lost our conuninnent to a "hierarchical,
essentialist metaphysic "-presence replaoed by an absence-we have fallen into
a world of process, divorced from origins, nature, God, each other. A writer
can only approach that ideal world in the process of fiction. The isolated
self, seeking to commune with others from a Ie privileged" position, generates
" enchannnents" which transcend the limits of the material world; yet that
process-born of desire and not of love-sows the seeds of its own "disenchantment."
Such a view of Hawthorne's work proceeds from the "home satisfaction"
of The House of the Seven Gabler, rather than the "hell-fired" quality of
The Scarlet Letter. H the conclusion of the former seems brittle or forced,
Dryden argues, it is a sign of our distance from an ideal world: love is a
sacred relationship in a secn1ar world. But in The Scarlet Letter-which
receives little attention here-Hawthorne wondered whether "hatred and love
be not the same thing at bottom." And in his notebooks he suggested that
"Selfishness is one of the qualities apt to inspire love." Where Dryden distinguishes between desire's acquisitiveness and love's surrender, Hawthorne
seemed to yoke the two as aspects of one ambivalent relationship. Perhaps his
Love Letters are themselves fictions and their disenchantment is only revealed
in the "last sad years of his life" (p. 162). But to suggest that wonld be
to place the texts as objects in a larger context, and Dryden is hesitant to
disturb "the spell cast over us by the fictive world" (p. 13).
Because Dryden reconstructs an II inside narrative" of Hawthorne's texts, in
which Hawthorne figures as a II thematic self," sentimental longings for home
and love are not analyzed but generalized and celebrated. This raises problems
in reading The Marble Faun, for instance, and Dryden can only acknowledge
a "gentle nostalgia" and "mild irony." When viewed from inside the text,
Hawthorne's" society" appears as the generalized remcation of fictions created
by man in the process of extending his frontiers and humanizing nature; in
The Blhbedale Romance particularly, however, it is "nature" which is inside
" society"-" man " and II nature" are abstractions whose meanings are grounded in Coverdale's imperfect consciousness of his particular social relations.
Similarly, the history of Salem or Rome, when viewed from inside the text
(which they are themselves inside) takes on an objective reality which Dryden
is loath to confer upon Hawarorne or his texts. From the inside, Hawthorne's
nostalgia becomes man's quest for origins, his wish for self-annihilation becomes
"love" or the U peaceful luxury" of home, his alienation becomes the burden
of man's U lost plenitude," and his artistic decline becomes" a writer's...coming
but
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to awareness" of "hidden truths" (p. 11). Thus, Dryden's criticism, since it
will not" disenchant/' seems to compound mystifications.
JOliN FRANZOSA

Wayne State University

Richard Lanham. Tbe Motives of Eloquence: Literary Rhetoric in the Renaissance. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976. Pp. 234. $12.50.

Distinguishing "serious" and "rhetorical" kinds of literature embodying,
respectively, the "central self" and the "social self," Richard Lanham argues
that such works as Ovid's Metamorphoses, Rabelais' Gargcmtua ami Pantagruel,
and Shakespeare's Venus and Adonis, should be seen from ludic and (Burkean)
rhetorical points of view. He claims that" The central wisdom of Western
literature lies in its basic structural pattern, its rich and contentious mixture
of serious and rhetorical reality. It is this mixture which everywhere ought
to be cherished Cpo 219). He, therefore, emphasizes the rhetorically playful
elements of such serious works as Shakespeare's Henry V and the ultimately
profound implications of works, like Castiglione's 11 Cortegicmo, that pose as
non-serious, rhetorical performances. As in his earlier studies of Sidney's Old
Arcadia and Sterne's Tristf(mz Shandy, Lanham is a strong apologist for style
as significant content, the matter in the manner. Here, his approach works
best on Castiglione's book, Shakespeare's Venus and Adanis, and Rabelais'
masterpiece, texts that involve a comic perspective on reality. Though he has
little new to say about Chaucer's works or Shakespeare's H«mlet, his analyses
of the creatively disturbing effect of Bembo's speech in the last book of It
Cortegiano and of the inevitability of critical allegorization of Gargantua and
Pantagruel illustrate the strengths of his method. His sensitivity to "style/
subject discontinuities" (p. 113) is everywhere acute: critics of Renaissance
literature ought, for example, to heed his suggestion that it is necessary to
attend to the clashes between the political theories and political realities
implied by particular works.
There are problems, however, with Lanham's book, and with his whole
critical project. First, all texts treated by him begin to sound alike. One of
the reasons for this is that, though he declares social context to be of crucial
significance, he does not choose to give careful historical definitions of the
environments of individual works. Next, though (citing Michel Beaujour) he
mentions the possible social effects of mixing or assaulting traditional literary
genres, he does not develop the relevance of this rich, topic to his general
discussion. Also, though he assumes that "a theory of rhetorical style will
always invoke a theory of motive t a theory of identity, and a theory of knowledge" (p. 210), he himself employs only simple, commonsensical psychological
and epistemological (to say nothing of cultural-historical) notions. TIns is
unfortunate since, for example, his repeated uses of the words "narcissism"
and "narcissistic" to describe different forms of behavior in different social
frames would seem to require more complex cultural and psychological matrices.
1)
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Finally, his Burkean, II dramatistic" approach to both life and art leads him,
despite his emphasis upon the mixing of playful and serious in literature, to a
damaging nominalistic rejection of substantive status for the external world as
well as to an argumentatively slippery scepticism about the human self and
identity. Ignoring the psychological, sociological, and metaphysical implications of the play-frame in play experience, he expands play and game to
include all human and cultural realities, thus jeopardizing both his general thesis
and the distinctive meaning of the ludic.
ARTHUR

lVayne State University
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